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minate factors and influences is a hazardous pursuit. The decade of the 1970s was 
relatively peaceful but it remains to be seen if the degree of ethnic tension and 
polarization has recently decreased or increased in Quebec. Much of what 
happens will be contingent on the PQ's leadership and the outcome of efforts at 
constitutional change. The outlook is not black, but there are no grounds for 
complacency. 
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IRAN'S RIVAL GROUPS 
by Maurice Tugwell 
The success of the fundamentalist Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in Iran's 
second-round parliamentary elections seems likely to strengthen the power of 
the religious zealots who have been the driving force inside the Revolutionary 
Council, the country's interim government. The likely losers will be the relative 
moderates, notably President Bani Sadr. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini will 
remain as holy figurehead, providing the semblance of unity within the nation, 
but after his death we may witness a power struggle both within the IRP, 
between such figures as Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Mohammed Beheshti, and 
between the IRP and rival political groups in Tehran and breakaway sects on 
Iran's periphery. This article attempts to list these alternative regimes and to 
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provide the background necessary if tomorrow's events in Iran are to be 
comprehensible. 
The Communist "Tudeh" (Masses) Party 
Founded in 1941, banned after 1949, the Tudeh succeeded in the early 1950s 
in infiltrating the Iranian Armed Forces and played a significant part in the brief 
overthrow of the Shah in 1953.' Indeed it was the communist power behind Dr. 
Mossadegh's government that probably caused the United States and Britain to 
back Royalist elements in the Army in their successful bid to unseat the new 
regime and reinstate the monarchy. SAVAK was formed to root out com-
munists within the armed forces, government and society, and afterwards 
became the Shah's instrument for the detection and suppression of all forms of 
political dissent.2 After the rapprochement between Iran and USSR in the 
mid-1960s, Tudeh lost Moscow's overt support. Based in East Germany, the 
party forfeited the leadership of anti-Shah protest within Iran, and its continued 
dependence on an atheist USSR which cooperated with the Shah further alien-
ated it from radicals.3 Possibly the Tudeh's greatest value to the USSR during 
the 1960s and '70s arose out of its conversions during the heady days of the early 
1950s. 
When in December 1977 Major General Ahmad Mogharrabi, chief of army 
planning and logistics, was executed by firing squad, an 11-year career as a 
Soviet agent was ended. Mogharrabi had first been compromised as an army 
major in the early 1950's when, under the Mossadegh government, Tudeh was 
made legal. He was persuaded by a party member to hand classified material to 
Soviet intelligence. He escaped SAVAK's dragnet and continued his military 
career, being "reactivated" as a Soviet agent in 1966 while attending a training 
course at Fort Bragg, USA. An American agent blackmailed him through his 
earlier compromising behaviour and he was forced to hand over his country's 
secrets or be betrayed to SAVAK. Until his activities were uncovered 11 years 
later, the General's importance to Soviet intelligence was great.4 Several similar 
cases came to light, and it may be safe to assume that certain key Soviet agents 
remained undetected in high places until the Islamic revolution cleansed Iran of 
both the Shah and SAVAK, and the spies who had infiltrated the system. 
The Tudeh's present leader, Nourredin Khianouri, has attempted to identify 
his party with the mass movements that swept the imperial regime from power. 
However its close ties to a foreign country and its atheist ideology continue to 
limit its popular appeal. It would, however, be dangerous to dismiss the Iranian 
communists as a spent force. During the revolution of 1978 and '79, Tudeh 
succeeded in penetrating the oil workers' unions in Khuzestan in southern Iran.5 
Always strong on organization, the orthodox communist finds the union 
particularly well suited to his needs, since the materialistic objectives of union 
business can be developed into political action. Although the Revolutionary 
Council's komites have attempted to re-establish Islamic control of the oilfields 
and refineries, it is unlikely that communist influence there has been removed. 
The second area of significant Tudeh power is the north-western province of 
Azerbaijan, which will be discussed later. Finally it should be remembered that 
in any bid by the Soviet Union to set up a puppet government in Tehran, only the 
Tudeh party can be relied upon as being fully subordinate to Moscow's 
command. With an estimated active membership of only 1,000, the Tudeh's 
main power lies outside Iran, in the Soviet Army. 
The "Fedayin-e-Khalq" (People's Fighters) 
The so-called Islamic-Marxists of the 1970s, the Fedayin were responsible for 
most of the terrorist attacks during the Shah's rule, which were often directed 
against American servicemen or technicians. They played an active role in the 
revolution and are well-armed and militant.6 In March 1980 the Revolutionary 
Council ordered its komites to eject left-wing students from Iran's university 
campuses. At least 26 people were killed in the subsequent rioting at the univer-
sities in Tehran, Meshed, Shiraz and Isfahan. Six more died in Rasht, on the 
Caspian Sea, in an area where the left has a powerful appeal. Most victims were 
from the Fedayin. This group has assumed much of the glamour and status that 
once belonged to Tudeh, being seen as independent of Soviet control and an 
active force in protest. So long as Khomeini lives, the Fedayin's challenge is 
likely to be covert. But once the central figure has departed, the opportunity to 
exploit an unstable situation may lead to an overt bid for power. 
The "Mujaheddin-e-Khalq" (People's Crusaders) 
While the Fedayin are Marxist-Secularist the Mujaheddin are a radical 
Islamic grouping claiming to be "Marxist" in programme but without atheism. 
They too are well armed guerrillas who fought the Shah, and they outnumber 
both the Tudeh and the Fedayin.1 Their platform allows them to pay homage to 
Khomeini while pursuing an independent political line, and they tended to stand 
aside during the crack-down on the Fedayin. The Mujaheddin are influenced by 
the late Dr. Ali Shariati, an Iranian radical intellectual who sought to return to 
the roots of Islam and often accused the clergy of corrupting the religion's social 
message. The danger to the west of a Mujaheddin Iranian government might lie 
in possible coalitions with the Fedayin and Tudeh, which could be exploited by 
Moscow towards orthodox communist alignments. If, however, this problem 
could be avoided, the Mujaheddin might provide a rational and socially progres-
sive government. "Marxist" theories which are free of Soviet control have in 
some Third World countries been translated into a form of democratic social-
ism, and the West can make a fool of itself by running scared from a word. The 
Mujaheddin's leader, Masud Rajavi, insists: "We are progressive, not 
anarchists"." 
The Embassy Militants 
No analyst has succeeded in describing the political philosophy of the so-
called students who have been holding the American hostages in Tehran. They 
probably contain elements of the IRP and all three leftist groups. Those who 
accuse the KGB of attempting to manipulate the militants are probably correct, 
but the rumours that followed the unsuccessful rescue attempt suggested that the 
CIA had not been slow getting into this act. The revolutionary propaganda that 
rallied the Iranian masses against the Shah relied entirely on hatred and could 
not, therefore, be converted into integration or nation-building propaganda once 
the rebellion had succeeded. The Islamic regime has consequently been forced to 
continue to rely on hatred, which is a dangerous emotion rather easily turned 
inwards against the rulers. Khomeini and his henchmen have used the American 
hostages as a visible symbol of a supposed external threat, a substitute focus for 
hatred in the absence of the Shah. The hostages' importance to Iran is a measure 
of that country's internal weakness. The militants are neither a political party 
nor foreign agents: they are a symptom of national xenophobia. 
Conservatives, Liberals, Monarchists et al 
The New York Times reported in April9 that at a recent gathering of Tehran's 
artists, the painters and sculptors in bohemian garb agreed that they were all 
longing for a military coup. Certainly there are many intellectuals, writers, 
teachers, technocrats and others who supported the overthrow of the Shah only 
to find themselves isolated and ignored in an Iran gone mad with Islamic excess. 
Islamic militants have accused the former premier Mehdi Bazargan of allowing 
his Freedom Movement to be controlled by the United States.'" Meanwhile, 
Bazargan's predecessor, Shapour Bakhtiar issues statements from his Paris 
exile, and the Crown Prince, whose new home is in America, refrains from 
public comment. No one who worked in Iran during the Shah's period of great-
ness," before he abandoned internal politics for international posturing, can 
forget the passionate loyalty of the nation's masses. Whether bought, inspired 
by propaganda, or enforced, Iranian devotion to monarchy is a very old and 
deep emotion, which may at some future date again become a political force. 
Indeed, the lengths to which the present regime finds it necessary to go to 
blacken monarchy's reputation may be seen as a back-handed tribute to the 
past. The missing ingredient in any conservative coup would seem to be the 
army. The failure of the Shah during his last year on the throne to provide the 
leadership expected of him left the army powerless to act decisively, yet com-
mitted to tactics that broke its morale. The Revolutionary Council purged 
senior military ranks and, by failing to disarm the revolutionary guards or the 
left-wing groups, have further diminished the army's standing and power. The 
Iranian middle class has no tradition of political responsibility. Without an 
effective army to back them, they pose no credible challenge. Any return to 
monarchy, or the establishment of a moderate centre government, seems 
unlikely at present. 
The Periphery 
The Caspian provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran were occupied by Russian 
Bolsheviks between 1920 and 1921, and the north-western province of 
Azerbaijan was retained under Soviet control after the end of World War II." In 
the same period, Stalinist Russia sponsored secessionist movements both in 
occupied Azerbaijan and in adjacent Kurdistan. The Shah, and before him his 
father, put an end to these invasions, but the threat of centrifugal forces pulling 
the country apart still remains and is made greater by weak and unpopular 
central government. Whether or not the Soviet Union is still prepared to 
sponsor such movements remains to be seen. One effect of earlier attempts was 
to lower Russia's esteem, and hence its influence, in Tehran. 
With or without external help, we have already seen signs of a revival of 
tribalism and demands for provincial autonomy, or even secession, from Iran's 
periphery. Azerbaijani unrest centred on Tabriz, where in December 1979 
Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari encouraged the formation of the Moslem 
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People's Party." Riots and bloodshed ensued, although for the time-being the 
province seems quieter. The Tudeh have strength here, and with the Soviet army 
less than four hours motoring away, Azerbaijan must be seen as a particularly 
vulnerable region. Kurdistan erupted earlier, in August 1979. Promised an 
autonomous state by the Treaty of Serres in 1921, the Kurdish tribesmen who 
inhabit sections of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the Soviet Union regard their 
struggle as a nationalist crusade. After the fall of the monarchy the Kurds 
established a de facto autonomy and asked the new Tehran authorities for 
recognition. However Islamic rigidity combined with Persian chauvinism and 
the Revolutionary Council despatched troops, tanks and fighter aircraft to 
crush this uprising, and murdered their prisoners in an effort to terrorize the 
Kurds into submission.14 
Further south, in Khuzestan, neighbouring Iraq seems willing to "play the 
Arab card" by stirring up unrest in a province where Arab Iranians are the 
majority ethnic community, and where most of Iran's oil wealth is situated. 
After crack-downs by the Revolutionary Council, Arabs seized the London 
Iranian embassy demanding the release of 91 prisoners, but this tactic was 
defeated by the British.15 It is unclear what role, if any, Tudeh is playing in the 
oil industry at this time. Like the Kurds to the north, the Arabian Iranians are 
mainly Sunni Moslems, not Shias, and are therefore unimpressed by the charis-
matic claims of the Ayatollah. 
Baluchistan straddles the Iranian, Afghani and Pakistani borders, countries 
with respective Baluchi populations of 1, 0.3 and 1.25 millions.16 A rebellion 
inside the Pakistani section between 1973 and 1977 cost the lives of an estimated 
3,300 Pakistani soldiers and 5,300 Baluchi guerrillas, yet the urge for autonomy 
has not been crushed. Now that the Soviets have control of the Afghani section, 
they might win friends locally by supporting a Baluchi state, sending arms and 
advisors to the Iranian and Pakistani "occupied zones", and hope to end up with 
control over the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar (in Pakistan) and the new naval 
and air facility at Char Bahar (in Iran). This type of action would involve small 
risk of war, and could be explained internationally as a moral necessity. Finally, 
in Iran's north-east, there are some 500,000 Mongol-stock Turkomans, border-
ing Soviet Russia. Their call for autonomy was quickly suppressed by federal 
militia,17 but their existence may provide another opportunity for meddling 
should the USSR be so inclined. The writer thinks it likely that the Soviet 
leaders are presently too concerned to improve relations at the centre to wish to 
stir up trouble on the edges. If, however, a stable regime were to arise in Tehran 
that was unwilling to grant the Soviet Union the special status that she desires, 
the indirect route might be chosen. 
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ZIMBABWE JOINS THE COMMONWEALTH 
by Dominick Graham 
At one minute after midnight on the 18th April an independent Republic of 
Zimbabwe joined the Commonwealth.1 The birth of the Republic was a 
diplomatic and political miracle wrought by Britain, an act of faith by the men 
who were recently destroying each other in a civil war, and, not least, a reminder 
to the cynics that our Commonwealth is the only international organization 
that could have played midwife and did so. 
Lord Carrington, Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and 
Dr. Mudawarara signed the agreement to end the war on 21 December 1979. 
They undertook to return Rhodesia to colonial status under British authority 
and to hold elections. Lord Soames, the interim governor, had been in Salisbury 
since 10th December. A Commonwealth Observer Group from eleven nations 
— Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Jamaica, 
Papua-New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka — would observe the British 
administered elections for the whites on 14 February and for the blacks on 27-9 
February 1980. In the meanwhile a Commonwealth cease-fire monitoring force 
would see that the two armies of the Patriotic Front, Zipra and Zanla, moved to 
16 assembly points throughout the country and remained there until the 
elections were over. This force was drawn from the U.K., Kenya, Fiji, Australia 
and New Zealand. Less than 2000 in number and lightly armed, it would be 
thinly spread across the country in isolated stations in the heart of the PF bush.2 
The monitors had been on standby for weeks and moved to Rhodesia over 
Christmas in order to be ready when the cease-fire came into force. "Good luck 
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